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THE PUZZLE OF SHORT-TERMISM 
Kent Greenfield 
INTRODUCTION 
When pondering the question of the “sustainable corporation,” 
as we did in this symposium, one of the intractable problems is the 
nature of the corporation to produce externalities.  By noting this 
characteristic, I am not making a moral point but an economic one.  
The nature of the firm is to create financial wealth by producing 
goods and services for profit; without regulatory or contractual 
limits, the firm has every incentive to externalize costs onto those 
whose interests are not included in the firm’s current financial 
calculus.  In fact, because of the corporation’s tendency to create 
benefits for itself by pushing costs onto others, the corporation could 
aptly be called an “externality machine.”1 
The obvious kind of externality is the one that happens in the 
same time frame as the benefits gained.  These current externalities 
take a number of forms.  A company might refuse to provide health 
benefits to its employees, leaving Medicare or Medicaid to pick up 
the tab.2  The company might save on production costs by skirting 
environmental laws, thereby forcing communities, neighbors, or 
employees to suffer risks of harm that do not need to be accounted 
for on the company’s financial statements.3  Alternatively, the 
 
  Professor of Law and Law Fund Research Scholar, Boston College Law 
School.  I would like to thank Alan Palmiter for the invitation to take part in 
such an interesting symposium.  Brian Quinn and David Wood offered valuable 
comments on an earlier version of this Essay, and Michael Girma Kebede 
provided excellent research assistance.  An earlier version of this Essay was 
published in the conference papers of the Second Summit on The Future of the 
Corporation, June 2009. 
 1. See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S 
NEWEST EXPORT 49–65 (2001) (calling the corporation an “externalizing 
machine”). 
 2. See, e.g., WAL-MART: THE HIGH COST OF LOW PRICE (Brave New Films 
2005). 
 3. See Joseph Kahn & Jim Yardley, As China Roars, Pollution Reaches 
Deadly Extremes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, at A1; Jane Perlez & Raymond 
Bonner, Below a Mountain of Wealth, a River of Waste, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 
2005, at A1. 
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company could sell shoddy products to one-time purchasers, produce 
goods in sweatshops, or underfund employees’ pension funds.4 
These kinds of externalities are routine to notice and remark 
on.  They are also the subject of some push-back from stakeholders 
and regulators.  Those who bear the cost can assert their interests in 
various ways.5 
The more difficult kind of externality to address—especially if 
our focus is on the sustainability of the corporation—is the future 
externality.  What I mean here is the kind of cost that a 
corporation’s management can externalize to the future.  From 
management’s perspective, the future is a much more attractive 
place to push off costs.  Stakeholders who must bear such future 
costs will be less aware of those costs than current costs, and even if 
they do learn of such future costs, they will be less able to gain the 
attention of regulators. 
The aim of this Essay is to ask about one particular kind of 
future externality: future costs to shareholders.  I recognize that 
shareholders are not usually the focus in a discussion of 
externalities.  In the present, their interests are sufficiently (even if 
not perfectly) aligned with those of management that we need not 
concern ourselves with externalities borne by shareholders other 
than through the usual corporate governance tools.  But in the case 
of future externalities, the analysis is more complex.  Current 
shareholders may prioritize present returns over future returns,6 
and current shareholders may not expect to be future shareholders 
at all.  This means that corporate managers have incentives not only 
to externalize costs to current and future stakeholders whose 
interests they can ignore but also to future shareholders as well.  
This means that corporations will, by their very natures, be fixated 
on the short term. 
If one is worried about the sustainability of corporations from 
an environmental, social, or political perspective, the problem of 
“short-termism” has to be a central worry.  This is because, at least 
 
 4. See Steven Greenhouse & Michael Barbaro, An Ugly Side of Free Trade: 
Sweatshops in Jordan, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2006, at C1; Roger Lowenstein, The 
End of Pensions?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 30, 2005, at 56, 62–63; Fact Sheet 
Making Change at Wal-Mart, UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS INT’L 
UNION, http://makingchangeatwalmart.org/fact-sheet/ (last visited Aug. 23, 
2011).  For a related (and more provocative) example, see Kent Greenfield, 
September 11th and the End of History for Corporate Law, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1409 
(2002). 
 5. See, e.g., David Yermack, Shareholder Voting and Corporate 
Governance, 2 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 103 (2010) (reviewing empirical research on 
shareholder voting). 
 6. See, e.g., Alan R. Palmiter & Ahmed E. Taha, Mutual Fund Investors: 
Divergent Profiles, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 934, 994–98 (2008) (discussing 
propensity of investors to choose a mutual fund based on past performance 
irrespective of future performance). 
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according to many who have thought seriously about the topic,7 in 
the long run the interests of corporations conflate with those of 
society as a whole.  (For the sake of this Essay I will assume this to 
be the case, though I have stated some disagreement elsewhere.8)  
Short-termism is a problem whether we focus our attention on the 
sustainability of the corporation or the ethics of its management.9 
Short-termism is also costly economically, since the economy as 
a whole benefits when companies have a long-term strategy.  The 
economy is a summation of the fortunes of the millions of companies 
and individuals that make it up; if most companies make decisions 
that prioritize the short-term at the expense of the long-term, we all 
suffer.10  A nation’s wealth grows more over time when companies 
invest for the future and maintain their viability as a going concern. 
The financial crisis of 2008 brought into sharp relief the 
economic costs of short-term management.  Among the competing 
theories on the cause of the financial collapse—the over-dependence 
on derivatives, the overuse of leverage, the culture of greed and 
entitlement in the finance industry, just to name a few11—a focus on 
the short term is an omnipresent narrative thread.  If managers and 
financiers had taken a more long-term view of the health of their 
own companies and the fortunes of their investors, we might not 
have seen the myriad other problems come to such a head.  The 
addiction to leverage, derivatives, and greed that caused the market 
to become a casino would only have been possible in a business 
culture where short-term gains are prioritized over long-term costs.  
What might have been assumed to be costs that would be suffered 
some time in the distant future are being absorbed now.  John 
Maynard Keynes was wrong on this point: in the long run, we are 
not all dead.12 
 
 7. See, e.g., Andrew C. Coors & Wayne Winegarden, Corporate Social 
Responsibility—Or Good Advertising?, REG., Spring 2005, at 10, 10 (“A profit-
centric firm provides the optimal amount of socially responsible behavior.”); 
Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine) at 32. 
 8. See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL 
FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 134–42 (2006). 
 9. Kent Greenfield, Corporate Ethics in a Devilish System, 3 J. BUS. & 
TECH. L. 427 passim (2008). 
 10. See Michael E. Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America’s Failing Capital 
Investment System, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1992, at 65, 76–77 (arguing 
investors should take a long-term view). 
 11. See, e.g., LIAQUAT AHAMED, LORDS OF FINANCE: THE BANKERS WHO 
BROKE THE WORLD 14 (2009); WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS: A TALE OF 
HUBRIS AND WRETCHED EXCESS ON WALL STREET 303, 426, 531 (2010). 
 12. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (1924) (“But 
this long run is a misleading guide to current affairs.  In the long run we are all 
dead.”). 
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So despite some naysayers,13 the problem of short-termism is 
very real.  Shareholders hold their stocks, on average, for less than a 
year, and even less for small companies.14  Institutional investors 
have been said to be particularly bad on this front, acting “more as 
traders, seeking short-term gain.”15  Managers admit that they 
make decisions that harm the company in the long-term in order to 
meet short-term earnings expectations.16  In 2006, both the 
Conference Board and the Business Roundtable, two of the nation’s 
most prominent business organizations, issued reports “decrying the 
short-term focus of the stock market and its dominance over 
American business behavior.”17  And, let’s remember, that was two 
years before the collapse. 
But there is a puzzle.  In contrast to the others who suffer the 
costs of future externalities, future shareholders have a way to 
communicate with present-day managers and shareholders.  They 
“communicate” with the present by way of the market.  What I mean 
is that in a well-functioning, efficient market, present-day decisions 
that exact a future cost will affect present-day stock price.  Current 
stock price will be affected by future losses because current stock 
price is a function (in part) of future profitability of the firm.  With 
that truth in mind, why do managers focus on the short term?  Why 
would a company benefit from short-term management?  If short-
termism is a problem because it falsely inflates the company’s stock 
price, how does that occur?  That is, why would share prices be 
inflated rather than depressed for such a company? 
I.  THE SHORT-TERM PUZZLE 
Consider that any shareholder who sells her stock in order to 
profit in the short-term is selling to someone else, who by definition 
believes that the stock is selling for less than it is worth.  Share 
turnover is not by definition a problem, then, since for every seller 
there is a buyer.  Moreover, it ought to be irrational for Wall Street 
analysts to require—and company management to make—decisions 
that hurt the company in the long run but allow the company to 
meet short-term earnings projections.  In such situations the share 
price should fall rather than increase or stay steady.  The reason is 
 
 13. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Stakeholder Governance: A Bad Idea 
Getting Worse, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1107, 1109–11 (2008) (denying a 
problem with short-termism exists). 
 14. LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: HOW FINANCE 
TRIUMPHED OVER INDUSTRY 277–78 (2007). 
 15. ROBERT KUTTNER, THE SQUANDERING OF AMERICA: HOW THE FAILURE OF 
OUR POLITICS UNDERMINES OUR PROSPERITY 144 (2007). 
 16. MITCHELL, supra note 14, at 1. 
 17. Id.; see also Lee Drutman, The Long Term Value Moment, AM. 
PROSPECT, July 9, 2007, http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_longterm 
_value_moment (cataloging various studies pointing out the pathologies of 
short-termism as a business strategy). 
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that in an efficient market, share price is a reflection of the 
company’s value.  If decisions are being made to decrease the true 
value of the firm then the share price should reflect that.18 
To offer a concrete example, let’s say a company chooses to 
adjust its accounting treatment in such a way as to accelerate 
earnings and delay costs for the current quarter.  This will give the 
appearance of a greater profit in the current period, perhaps 
allowing the company to report to Wall Street analysts that the 
company has met its earnings expectations.  But no rational, 
informed investor would pay a higher price for shares in such a 
company since the company’s value has not changed in reality.  
Rather, since the company is still making the same products or 
providing the same services, its long-term prospects have not 
changed for the better and may have changed for the worse if 
management has been spending its energy on accounting rather 
than productive pursuits. 
Indeed, if the company is in fact being managed for the short-
term at the expense of the long-term, the share price should fall 
dramatically and consistently.  The rational buyer would not be 
willing to pay any more for each share than the sum of the total 
dividend payments coming to her in the future on the basis of that 
share (discounted to present value).19  And if shareholders know 
that the company has made future dividends less likely because of 
management’s short-term orientation, then the market price of the 
stock will reflect this even if the short-term earnings are inflated.  
Indeed, share price should be expected to fall consistently over the 
period of such managerial strategy.  Again, to make the point 
concrete: if managers intentionally manage a company to accelerate 
all profit and earnings into the next five-year period and then go 
bankrupt, no informed shareholder should purchase shares of that 
company at the current price.  The shares will be worthless in five 
years, and fall dramatically in value between now and then. 
In figuring out this puzzle, allow me to make an assumption 
that will simplify the analysis as we go.  Allow me to assume that 
 
 18. Aleta G. Estreicher, Beyond Agency Costs: Managing the Corporation 
for the Long Term, 45 RUTGERS. L. REV. 513, 534 (arguing that for adherents of 
Efficient Market Hypothesis, any discussion of short-term versus long-term 
strategies and interests is misguided because in a perfectly efficient market, 
common stock prices should reflect the sum of all dividends and all payouts to 
be expected in the future, discounted to their present value); see also R.A. 
BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON STOCKS 67–68 
(2d ed. 1983); VICTOR BRUNDEY & MARVIN CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON CORPORATE FINANCE 479–82 (2d ed. 1987); BENJAMIN GRAHAM ET AL., 
SECURITY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUE 480–81 (4th ed. 1962). 
 19. See Robert J. Shiller, Market Volatility and Investor Behavior, 80 AMER. 
ECON. REV., 58, 58 (1990) (surveying literature confirming that rational 
investors price stocks as present values of forecasted dividends, and forecasts 
are based on lagged real dividends). 
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there are two kinds of companies: one that manages for the short-
term and one for the long-term.  The short-term company seeks to 
maximize profits and earnings in the near future and disregards the 
long-term.  If decisions can be made to transfer value from the 
future into the present day, the management will do so—even if it 
will decrease the total value of the firm aggregated over time.  (I’ll 
set aside for the moment why management would do this.)  Long-
term-oriented companies will make decisions that seek to maximize 
the value of the company over time.  If decisions can be made in the 
short-term that cost the company money but will pay returns in the 
future, then the company will do so—even if in so doing the 
company will be unable to recognize profits in the near future. 
In a company whose management team is oriented toward the 
long-term, one would expect to see a greater-than-usual dedication 
to sustaining the company as a going concern over time; a larger 
commitment to maintaining the loyalty of those who have made 
investments in the company, whether by way of capital, 
infrastructure, or work; a dedication to the development of products 
or services that will pay off in the future; a diversification of firm 
endeavors and investments to guard against short-term shocks in 
the financial or consumer markets; and so on.20 
On the other hand, a company focusing on the short-term will 
also have a number of strategies at its disposal.21  Here is an 
illustrative list, which is hardly exhaustive: 
Cuts in research and development, in order to use the capital 
that would be spent for R&D to increase dividends or retained 
earnings temporarily, at a cost to the long-term health of the 
company; 
Accounting adjustments (either legal or illegal) to accelerate 
recognition of revenue and delay recognition of expenses, 
inflating current earnings at the cost of deflating future 
earnings; 
The sale of profitable divisions or subsidiaries for cash, 
realizing future earnings of the division as a cash payment in 
the present, usually at a discount; 
A greater dependence on debt to finance company expenses 
and projects, which increases the company’s leverage, inflating 
 
 20. See Estreicher, supra note 18, at 550–53 (outlining long-term 
investment strategies and acknowledging an alarming underinvestment in 
long-term business strategies). 
 21. See generally John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey & Shivaram 
Rajgopal, The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, 40 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 3 (2005) (identifying various kinds of short-term strategies and 
analyzing managerial behavior with regard to such short-term pressures). 
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returns on equity as long as the company is doing well and the 
market is trending up, but with increased risk of insolvency if 
the market goes down; 
The use of executive compensation schemes that prioritize the 
satisfaction of short-term financial goals, incentivizing 
management to look only a few steps ahead; 
Breaches in implicit or explicit contracts and understandings 
with company stakeholders, which allow the company to seize 
the value of past investments by such stakeholders without 
paying them their expected returns (an example of this would 
be a change in company policy away from a commitment to 
providing stable employment and instead increasing its use of 
short-term, low-wage employment); 
Cuts in employment generally, since savings in labor costs 
occur in the short-term and costs to the company arising from 
a decrease in employee loyalty and specific human capital 
valuable to the company are incurred in the longer term; 
A disregard for latent risks in the company’s products or 
services, whether such risks be environmental (such as the 
risk of global warming brought about by the use of sport-utility 
vehicles), social (the social cost of violent media, for example), 
or financial (the risk of financial crisis brought about by the 
overuse of risky financial derivatives); 
Stock buybacks, which increase share price in the short term 
but deplete the company’s capital that could be used for a more 
productive purpose; and 
A focus on share price rather than the corporation’s value as a 
whole or the value of the corporation to its non-equity 
shareholders. 
Each of these short-term strategies will likely impose long-term 
costs onto the firm but have short-term benefits to the company, the 
management, or certain shareholders.  There may be situations in 
which such long-term costs are worth the short-term gain—for 
example, when the company needs to satisfy some short-term 
financial obligation (to pay a legal judgment, say) and can only do so 
if R&D expenditures are put off.  But by definition most of these 
strategies will be bad decisions for the firm in the long run. 
This is not to say that a company that refuses to engage in such 
short-term decisions will necessarily succeed.  Managers make 
mistakes, and some mistakes are quite costly.  Moreover, to the 
extent that a company’s time horizon is long, it may be more 
difficult to know whether a long-term strategy pays off more than a 
short-term strategy.  Also, a long-term strategy is more difficult: not 
only must a company’s management make decisions that are focused 
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on success five, ten, or twenty years out, it must also make short-
term, tactical decisions that work as well.  A part of a company’s 
long-term strategy must always be to survive in the short term.22 
So here we get to the nub of the problem: if by definition short-
termism is costly to companies in the long run and to the economy 
as a whole—because the economy is a summation of the well-being 
of everyone—then why do we see the short-term management 
tactics described above? 
II.  PUZZLING OUT THE PUZZLE 
One possible answer lies in the nature of management.  To state 
the obvious, companies are controlled by managers, and some 
managers intend to be at the company for a long period of time and 
therefore look toward the long-term.23  Other managers want to 
make their money and get out.  This would explain why some 
managers would want to manage their companies for the short 
term.24  But it does not explain why the market does not 
consistently punish such behavior.  If managers make decisions that 
will hurt the company in the long-term for selfish reasons, why does 
the share price not fall? 
Another answer might be that that some investors, too, focus on 
the short-term, so that they buy stock of companies so oriented.  But 
even that does not fully answer the question, since short-term-
oriented shareholders should not be able to realize any benefit from 
owning shares in a short-term-oriented company.  If dividends are 
inflated in the short-term at the cost of the long-term fortunes of the 
company, whatever benefit realized from the short-term dividends 
will be more than set-off by the decline in the stock price brought 
about by the decline in the real value of the company. 
In other words, if a company’s short-term strategy is known to 
the investing public, then the future drop in the value of the 
 
 22. See Robert M. Feinberg, In Defense of Corporate Myopia, 16 
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 205, 209 (1995) (arguing against the effects of 
imposing so-called “long-term management” through tax, subsidy, or regulatory 
incentives, which the author claims may lead to unproductive rent-seeking 
activity and other inefficient behavior unintentionally induced by such 
incentives); Gregory Jackson & Anastasia Petraki, Understanding Short-
termism: The Role of Corporate Governance, GLASSHOUSE F., 48 (2011), 
http://www.glasshouseforum.org/pdf/GF_jackson-petraki_short-termism.pdf 
(arguing that short-termism may be a rational managerial response to 
shareholder myopia in the face of high risk or uncertainty). 
 23. See Kevin J. Laverty, Economic “Short-Termism”: The Debate, the 
Unresolved Issues, and the Implications for Management Practice and Research, 
21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 825, 832 (1996). 
 24. See id. 
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company will be “baked in” to the current price.25  No benefit should 
be gained from such a strategy if indeed it is known to the investing 
public.  As the costs of the short-term strategy become clearer, the 
stock price will plummet, and those holding the shares of such a 
company will find fewer willing buyers. 
As for companies with long-term strategies, the future earnings 
will be reflected in current prices as well, so the stock price will be 
trading at a fairly high price-to-earnings ratio.  (The value of the 
future earnings will not be fully captured by the current share price, 
however, since investors will discount future earnings in relation to 
the time value of money and will also likely impose a “risk discount” 
in connection with the probability that the company will not actually 
realize the benefits of its long-term strategy.)  All in all, in a 
perfectly informed market, the value of long-term-oriented 
companies will tend to be recognized as such, and their share values 
will so reflect.26 
III.  THE INFORMATION FALLACY 
Of course this argument depends on an unreasonable and 
simplistic assumption—that the market is perfectly informed.27  In 
fact, investors are not perfectly informed, and it is often costly or 
impossible to determine whether companies are being managed for 
the long- or short-term.28  That is, it is often costly or impossible to 
determine whether an increase in quarterly earnings is evidence of a 
short-term orientation that will be costly to the company in the long-
term, or if the increase is due to the realization of returns from a 
successful long-term strategy. 
This fact poses a significant difficulty for public policy.  Profits 
and earnings for a long-term-oriented company may be 
 
 25. See id. at 833–34 (finding that many writers have argued, and many 
managers believe, that the stock market undervalues investments that will pay 
off only in the long run). 
 26. See Allan C. Eberhart, William F. Maxwell & Akhtar R. Siddique, An 
Examination of Long-Term Abnormal Stock Returns and Operating 
Performance Following R&D Increases, 59 J. FIN. 623, 648 (2004) (finding that 
investors systematically underreact to R&D investment, an example of a long-
term management decision, partly because they are not always fully informed). 
 27. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly 
Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 764 (1985) (“[T]he 
legal rush to embrace and apply the efficient market hypothesis has been overly 
precipitous and occasionally unwise.”).  Scholarship has called into question the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis’s (“EMH”) empirical and theoretical claims.  See, 
e.g., Stanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Fully 
Informed Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 405 (1980); Emanuel Sciubba, 
Asymmetrical Information and Survival in Financial Markets, 25 ECON. THEORY 
353, 370 (2005); William K.S. Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock Market is 
Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341 passim (1986). 
 28. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanics of Market 
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 580 (1984). 
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indistinguishable from profits and earnings for a short-term-
oriented company.  It is easy to show the numbers; it is rather 
difficult for most investors to determine the reason for such 
numbers.  In fact, a company that is utilizing some of the short-term 
managerial strategies listed above may show profits and earnings 
that are greater than companies with a long-term focus.  And capital 
markets may not “punish” such short-term management if it is not 
clear that the inflated earnings are based on strategies that are 
costly in the long-term. 
When a company’s management strategy is not known, or is not 
widely known, a company that is being managed for the short-term 
may have a share price that is inflated, only for the price to fall 
along with earnings when the strategy becomes clear.  Those 
investors holding the stock at the time of the fall will suffer the 
financial loss.  A windfall will be gained by those who are holding 
the stock during the run-up of the stock price and are fortunate 
enough to sell before the drop.  Also, a windfall will inure to 
managers who time their departure before the drop. 
As for long-term-oriented companies, the depressed short-term 
earnings brought about by the long-term strategy will not be easy to 
distinguish from depressed earnings caused by bad management or 
a short-term strategy that has run its course.  The stock price will 
also be discounted because it will be unclear to investors what the 
true strategy really is.  This in turn makes the company ripe for 
takeovers. 
So in a world in which (1) short-term management can result in 
short-term bumps in profits and earnings and (2) such earnings and 
profits are indistinguishable (or costly to distinguish) from those 
coming from long-term-oriented companies, then (3) the market will 
be slow in punishing short-term-oriented management.  That is, 
there will be a lag between the implementation of a short-term 
management strategy and when the chickens come home to roost—it 
may take some time for the capital market to price the shares 
correctly. 
The other side of the story should be told as well: it will often be 
difficult and costly to distinguish between a company that is 
showing a low level of short-term profits and earnings because of the 
costs of implementing a long-term strategy and a company that is 
showing a low level of profits and earnings because of poor 
management or a failure of strategy.  So the share price of the 
company that is actually being managed for the long-term—but 
showing no signs of success as of yet—will trade deceivingly low. 
The existence and extent of this lag time between the 
establishment of a long- or short- time horizon and the recognition of 
the costs or benefits thereof in the stock price will depend on a 
number of factors.  The most prominent of these will be how obvious 
the strategy is to investors in the market.  The more obvious the 
strategy, the more efficient the capital markets will be in “pricing” 
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the securities issued by the company.  If a company that is pursuing 
a short-term strategy is able to camouflage it as a long-term 
strategy, the stock price will be falsely inflated until the strategy 
becomes sufficiently clear to the investing public that they recognize 
that it is overpriced.  Only then will the share price fall to a level 
that correctly reflects the company’s value. 
Most investors will not invest the time to distinguish between 
the long-term companies that are not yet making money and the 
companies that are simply floundering.  Instead, they will look 
toward companies that are showing profits and earnings.  The 
problem here is that some of these companies—investors will 
assume—are realizing the benefits of successful long-term 
strategies, while others are simply exchanging long-term benefits for 
short-term profits at the cost of the company’s long-term prospects. 
IV.  SOPHISTICATED INVESTORS IN AN UNINFORMED MARKET 
Note that nothing I have said so far will be unknown to 
sophisticated investors.  They know that earnings and profits in the 
short-term do not necessarily translate into long-term success.  They 
know that a failure to show short-term earnings does not necessarily 
mean that the company is destined to fail.  But they also know that 
it is costly to figure out which is which, and that what counts to 
them is the value of their portfolio as a whole over time, not the 
profits from a single investment. 
So in maximizing the value of their portfolio, sophisticated 
investors face a variety of choices.  If such investors have a short-
term focus, perhaps because their own time horizons are short 
because of imminent retirement or the like, then they have no 
incentive to try to pick the long-term successes and hold for the 
long-term.  These investors will instead look for companies whose 
stocks will pay off in the short-term, whether such payoff comes as a 
result of short-term strategies with long-term consequences or as a 
result of companies that are realizing the payoffs of long-term 
strategies. 
As for long-term investors—individuals planning for retirement 
years in the future or investment funds that hold accounts for such 
people—one might expect that they would tend to “buy and hold” 
investments in companies that appear to be strong for the long-
term, even if short-term earnings are disappointing or foregone.  
That is true for some long-term investors, but certainly not all.  
Such long-term investors, whether individuals or institutions, face a 
choice: they can (1) try to identify companies that have successful 
long-term strategies but whose stock is undervalued at present; or 
(2) identify companies with high earnings and profits in the short-
term.  Some of the latter group will be truly successful companies; 
some will be companies that are utilizing strategies to emphasize 
short-term gain at the expense of long-term gain. 
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Both strategies are in fact followed by long-term investors.  
Both have their risks and costs.  Under the first strategy, the risk is 
that the investments chosen will not in fact pay off, and the major 
cost is the expense of discovering long-term-oriented, undervalued 
companies.  The cost of research under the second strategy is much 
less—an investor need only look at numbers.  The risk of the second 
strategy is holding too long.  If a stock’s inflated value becomes 
obvious to the market, the stock price will plummet.  In other words, 
the key to the second strategy is timing.  Get in, ride the wave, and 
get out before it crashes; then take your money and find another 
investment in the short-term market. 
It is important to note a key fact about the second strategy: a 
short-term investment strategy will become even more successful if 
the investor can control the timing of the investment’s withdrawal 
to capture as many of the short-term gains as possible before the 
inevitable downgrade in stock price. 
Most investors do not have any way to do that.  They can only 
try to stay ahead of the curve by trading often and quickly, usually 
on the slightest sign of downturn in a stock.  This makes the market 
as a whole more volatile, since small upticks in stock price will 
attract a host of short-termers looking for a place to put short-term 
money, and small downturns will cause many short-termers to flee 
in fear that the small downturn is the beginning of something worse.  
But such a strategy is highly risky, and unlikely to maximize gains 
over time (witness that very few mutual funds outperform index 
funds over time).29 
V.  MAKING A SHORT-TERM STRATEGY WORK IN  
AN UNINFORMED MARKET 
What if an investor could time their investments?  The gains 
from the short-term strategy could be immense.  The long-term 
value of their portfolios would be the summation of a series of above-
market, short-term gains.  And the strategy could be maintained as 
long as there are enough investment opportunities available so that 
the money investors pull out of one company can find a place to land 
elsewhere.  But how could such timing be accomplished? 
Let us imagine a situation in which investors—whether 
individual or institutional—can affect the time horizon of a 
company, to accelerate earnings and capture as much of the 
company’s future value as possible in the near term.  Let us also 
imagine a situation where they could keep that information 
 
 29. See David McPherson, Index Funds vs. Actively Managed Funds: Which 
is Better?, ABC NEWS (Oct. 20, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Business 
/PersonalFinance/index-funds-actively-managed-funds-best/story?id=8866429 
(citing a Morningstar study that found only thirty-seven percent of actively 
managed U.S. stock mutual funds beat their respective Morningstar indexes). 
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camouflaged from the market generally.  How would they do that?  
The answer is by taking over management of the company or by 
buying enough stock in a company that the management is forced to 
listen to you. 
Obviously, such a tactic would be available only to investors 
with significant capital to invest.  But if investors are successful in 
doing so—buying off management or buying up companies—then 
the company can be made to do the things that shift future company 
value to the present.  For example, the company can buy back stock, 
increasing immediate returns to investors; pay management 
exorbitant compensation, in effect taking present and future 
earnings of the company as individual compensation; sell off 
portions of the company for cash, distributing the cash as a 
dividend; or leverage the company highly, multiplying the return on 
equity at the cost of increased risk for the firm in the long-term. 
Moreover, while the investors themselves are managing the 
company in such a way, they need not make the true implications of 
their decisions clear to the investing public. 
One mechanism for taking control of companies in this way is 
private equity.  In fact, private equity funds are defined by this trait: 
they take over companies and manage them as private corporations, 
free from many of the reporting obligations required of public 
companies.  Also, certain hedge funds have such large amounts of 
capital to throw around that they may be able to get similar results 
from management without actually taking over the companies. 
And note that many managers may want to maximize short-
term earnings at the expense of the long-term.  Managers find it 
advantageous to use short-term strategies as well.  It is much easier 
to meet next quarter’s Wall Street earnings expectations, by hook or 
by crook, than it is to guide a company toward a long-term goal.  
And if their compensation consists primarily of stock and stock 
options, then they have incentives to consider themselves investors 
rather than managers.  When this is true, they can manipulate the 
company using the strategies described above to maximize their own 
short-term gain at the expense of the long-term health of the 
company, and time their departure before the company falls back to 
earth. 
VI.  WHAT TO EXPECT IN A SHORT-TERM MARKET 
So that’s the story of how short-term-oriented investors could 
collude with, or become, short-term-oriented management to cause 
businesses to manage for the short-term without being punished by 
the market in the short term.  Such a strategy will hurt the 
company in the long term and impose external costs onto company 
shareholders and stakeholders with long-term interests—as well as 
society and the economy in general.  But such costs will not be borne 
in the short term by the investors or managers.  As long as they “get 
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out” in time, they will be able to enjoy above-market returns.  And 
as long as they can continue to find companies that are susceptible 
to the same strategy, they can maintain above-market returns for 
the duration.  But of course such returns are not truly a reflection of 
anything other than being a winner in a zero-sum game.  The 
returns are not a reflection of excellent management, or product 
innovation, or the creation of value.  They are only, in economists’ 
terminology, the “extraction of rents,” the shifting of financial gain 
from someone who is losing at least as much.  The fact that those 
who are losing exist mostly in the future does not make the losses 
any less real. 
There is one last thing to recognize: in a market where 
companies are being increasingly managed for the short term, the 
typical “Main Street” investor will not stay in the dark forever.  
Investors who do not have the access or capital of the hedge funds 
and private equity funds will eventually recognize what is 
happening.  So they, too, will start investing with a view toward the 
short term, and be extremely sensitive to downticks in stock price 
that might be signs of a more serious downturn.  This will in turn 
make the market as a whole more volatile.  And as volatility 
increases, the entire market will become less secure.  More and 
more investors will either lose their shirts or simply leave the 
market and put their money elsewhere.  And eventually, the costs of 
short-term management will be such that the entire economy will 
suffer.  The chickens will eventually come home to roost. 
Over the last few years, I have noticed some roosting chickens.  
You? 
 
